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The issue considered here is the retail pricing of patented crop traits such as
Roundup Ready herbicide resistance or Bt insect resistance. Our concern is not with the
price of the seeds in which the traits are embodied, but rather with the implicit or explicit
price for the traits themselves. Intellectual property rights are now available for traits,
and while monopoly pricing of them has received some limited consideration in the
economics literature1, no one has yet examined the possible implications of the durability
of these traits as a factor in determining such monopolists' pricing behavior.

Monopoly pricing of durable goods
The theory of monopoly pricing of durables traces to Coase (1972). He noted that
when the seller of a new durable good sets a price in the first period, a fraction of
potential customers will buy, but the remaining fraction still remain as potential
customers in the next period. At a lower price in that next period, a fraction of the
remainder will buy, and similarly for the period after that. The seller clearly has a strong
incentive to exploit this kind of price discrimination through time. However, buyers will
probably anticipate this behavior, and thus have an incentive to wait for next period's
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lower price. It is difficult for the seller to make a credible commitment that he will not
reduce the price in the next period, given the obvious incentive to do so.
Thus Coase perceived a strategic game being played between the seller of the
durable and his potential buyers. The seller's strategy for reducing future prices must be
compatible with the buyers' incentives to wait for a lower price in the future. Buyers'
incentive to wait can be weakened by a credible commitment that prices will not in fact
fall in the future, but this credibility is difficult to establish. The outcome of the game, in
terms of an equilibrium pricing strategy through time, is not obvious. Coase concluded
that it is very likely that the equilibrium price will fall all the way to marginal cost (zero
in the situations considered in this paper) in every period. In this case the monopolist
earns no rents, let alone the "normal" monopoly rent obtainable by charging a single
once-and-for-all monopoly price, or the even larger rent from intertemporal price
discrimination. This conclusion has become known as the "Coase conjecture."
In this paper we first discuss the durablilty of crop traits and how it is determined
by technological considerations and by intellectual property rights. We then consider an
equilibrium pricing strategy emerging from a specific formulation of a pricing game that
is dependent on the nature of intellectual property rights.

Technology, property rights, and the durability of crop traits
For purposes of this analysis, a durable good is an input that provides a flow of
services for more than one production cycle. When seed is purchased, the producer
acquires a bundle of traits, each of which can be thought of as providing a flow of
services for the current crop year, and if the flow of services of a trait extends beyond
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that year, the trait may properly be considered a durable good. Varieties of crops such as
soybeans and wheat are created by a recurrent selection process from which only
phenotypically identical, self-replicating plants emerge. If seeds from such a crop are
saved and replanted, the traits persist into subsequent years, and are thus durables. For
crops such as corn, however, successful new cultivars are most often created by
hybridization, produced by the crossing of two or more distinctly different genotypes.
While the first generation of this cross is designed to be a highly uniform phenotypic
population for the commercial crop, the traits expressed by subsequent generations can
be disastrously heterogeneous. A trait expressed by a hybrid is therefore not a durable.
There are at least two other technological phenomena that may affect the
durability of crop traits. The first is "terminator" technology, such as the Technology
Protection System (TPS) owned jointly by Delta and Pine Land Co. and USDA.
Terminator seeds either produce a crop of sterile seeds, or a crop of seeds in which the
trait in question is switched off, in either case insuring that the trait at issue is not a
durable. The second technology is apomyxis, currently being developed by Pioneer and
CIMMYT, also not yet commercially viable. Apomyctic seeds produce a crop of viable
seeds that are genetically identical to the maternal plant. Seeds saved from an apomyctic
hybrid crop will replicate the commercial hybrid, thus insuring that all of the traits in the
crop are durables.
However, even if a crop trait is technologically durable, the seller may be able to
exclude a customer from future use of the trait. This possibility is determined by the
system of intellectual property rights and enforcement mechanisms to which a
technologically durable crop trait is subject. The two systems of intellectual property
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rights that are relevant to crop traits are utility patents and plant breeders' rights (Plant
Variety Protection or PVP in the U.S. and Union for the Protection of Varieties or UPOV
in much of the rest of the world.) If a crop trait is protected by a utility patent, the seller
will have the right to exclude the buyer from using the trait in subsequent years if he
wishes to do so, whereas if it is protected by plant breeders' rights, the seller does not
have that right (he only has the right to exclude the buyer from giving or selling the trait
to other producers.) While utility patents are clearly the stronger form of property rights,
they are not everywhere available, and they are more expensive to obtain. Within either
system of property rights, however, the degree to which the seller is able to exclude
future use of a durable trait depends on his enforcement effort and on the reliability and
cost of the legal system through which enforcement takes place.
To summarize, if we have a trait that is technologically durable, the effect of
patent protection is to allow the seller to exclude its use as a durable, while under
breeders' rights the trait is a legal durable. We turn now to an analysis of how these
alternatives might affect the sellers' choice of pricing strategy through time.

Property rights and the pricing of a non-durable crop trait
We first consider the pricing of a non-durable trait, which is similar to the pricing
problem facing any seller with a downward-sloping demand curve. Consider Fig. 1, for
example, in which we present a demand curve that is derived from a schedule of
heterogeneous users' valuations, v, of the expected benefit of a particular trait for one
crop year on, say, one hectare. We have scaled the function so that the valuation of the
highest-valuation user is set at 1.0, and the total number of users (or hectares) deriving
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any benefit at all from the trait is also set at 1.0. The valuation curve v = 1- q can
reasonably be considered to be the demand curve facing the owner of the trait. We
assume that the marginal cost of incorporating a trait in seed for additional crop area is
essentially zero.
In this stylized case with linear demand, the trait owner maximizes profit by
setting the standard monopoly price every year, p*= ½ , resulting in adoption (purchase)
of the trait by q = ½ of the potential users every year. The stream of monopoly rents
realized is thus r*=¼ , with present value PV*=k/4, where k is the capitalization rate,
presumed here to be the present value of a T-year annuity starting one year from the
present, or k= (1-(1+i)-T)/i, where i is the discount rate.
Where property rights for the crop trait are not perfect and costless to enforce, the
patent owner may not be able to exclude all pirating, or he may find it too costly to do so.
The effective demand curve is not evident in this case. Deardorff (1992) and Perrin
(1994) suggested that weakly-enforced property rights would result in payments only
from some randomly-selected fraction θ of potential customers. This proportional
pirating model implies that the quantity demanded is fraction θ of the quantity indicated
by demand curve v, or line vpp = 1-q/θ in Figure 2. The optimal monopolist price
remains at p*, but the optimal quantity to sell diminishes to θ /2, the annual flow of rents
falls to rpp = θ /4 = θ r*, and present value of rents falls to PVpp =θ k/4 =θ PV*.
Alternatively, Diwan and Rodrik (1991), followed by Perrin (1999), suggested
that in the presence of weak property rights there is a limit royalty price, equal to some
fraction φ of the valuation for each customer, above which piracy would occur. This
demand curve has height equal to fraction φ of curve v, or line vlp = φ - φq in Figure 2.

5

The optimal monopolist price falls to φ/2 , while the optimal quantity to sell remains at
½. The annual flow of rents is PVpp =φ k/4 =φ PV*, the same as for the proportional
pirating case if the fractions φ and θ are equal. Giannakas (2000) suggests further that
this limit pricing fraction φ may be determined by the customer's expected cost of being
caught pirating the trait, which is in turn determined by enforcement costs as well as by
the nature of the patent system. This allows him to explore the static pricing of the trait
within the framework of a regulatory game in which buyers, the monopolist, and the
regulator are players.
The two theories above offer alternative explanations as to how a simple linear
valuation schedule is transformed into the monopolist's derived demand curve when
property rights are less than perfect. Neither is particularly persuasive, since it seems
likely that potential customers' willingness to pirate is distributed in a way that is neither
strictly random as implied by the first, nor strictly proportional to the expected benefit of
pirating, as implied by the second. However, either approach is analytically convenient,
and we will use the limit pricing approach in the analysis of durable pricing to follow.

Nash equilibrium pricing of durable traits
We now consider an explicit theoretical model of Coase's durable goods pricing
theory to examine what intertemporal pricing strategies might emerge, and how they
would be affected by property rights. Here we seek a Nash equilibrium solution to the
game, which will insure the credibility of the resulting time path because by definition,
none of the players in the game will have an incentive to behave otherwise. We convert
the one-year valuation curve of Figure 1 to a valuation curve for the durable good using
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the capitalization rate k = (1-(1+i)-T)/i . The durable good valuation curve is V = kv = k –
kq, shown in Figure 3. Given this effective demand curve, the monopolist could charge
some arbitrary price P1 for the durable the first year, then in the second year charge the
monopolist price for the remaining portion of the demand curve, k/4, etc., and in this
manner extract most of the consumers' surplus.
However, buyers will anticipate this reduction in price, and a buyer with valuation
kv and discount factor δ = 1/(1+i) will have an incentive to wait until next year to
purchase if (V-Pt) < δ(V-Pet+1) , where Pet+1 is the price he expects to be charged for the
durable next year. Given this buyer incentive to wait, just how much will the seller
decide to charge the first year and how fast will the price fall? A considerable number of
papers have been published establishing conditions under which Coase's zero-profit
conjecture would hold (see Tirole, 1988, Ch 1.) Here we adapt a relatively simple model
that Tirole in turn adapted from Sobel and Takahashi.
Consider first the case of plant breeders' rights with costless enforcement. If the
monopolist could credibly establish that the trait would never be sold again, a one-time
price P* = k/2=kp* could be charged, maximizing profits by selling only to the half of
customers with the highest valuations. But it is difficult for the owner to assert credibly
that the trait will never be again, and if so the initial price must be compatible with the
buyer's incentive to wait for next year's lower price. We assume here that buyers'
strategy is to identify an optimal limit price fraction λ such that they will purchase if V=
kv > λP. The effective demand curve is then Pd = V/λ = k(1-q )/λ in Figure 3, similar to
the limit-pricing demand curve of Figure 2. At the price marked P1, buyers would
purchase quantity q1, realizing a surplus equal to the shaded area above the line P1 =µk ,
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leaving the monopolist the rent below it. We assume that the seller's strategy is to
identify an optimal mark-down ratio,µ , such that if the buyers with valuations above V =
kv=k(1-q) have already purchased the trait and the others have not, then he will set the
price at P = µV . This implies that the seller follows a pricing curve such as Pst = µ Vt-1
=µ k(1-qt-1 ) in Figure 3. This seller's behavior implies that the seller will charge an
initial price P1 = µ k . The buyers' behavior implies that the initial quantity purchased
will be q1 = 1- µλ , which in turn from the seller's behavior implies that P2 = µλP1 =
kλµ2 and q2 = 1- λP2/k = 1-(λµ)2, or in general, Pt = kλt-1µ t and qt =1- µ tλt (here note
that qt represents the total quantity sold since the first period, t = 1.)
The seller chooses the initial price to maximize the present value of future sales,
PV= P1q1 + δ P2(q2-q1) + δ 2P3( q3-q2) + …
= P1 (1-λP1/k) + δ P2(λP1/k - λP2/k ) + … .
Setting the derivative with respect to P1 equal to zero yields 1 - 2λP1/k + δP2λ/k = 0, and
since P1=µk and P2 = µλP1 , then 1 - 2λµ + δ (λµ)2 = 0. Solving this for µ we can
obtain the seller's reaction curve as
(1) µ = [1-(1-δ)1/2 ]/δλ .
For the marginal buyer at any point in time, V =λP, and because he is indifferent
to waiting, V - Pt = δ (V - Pt+1 ) . Given that Pt+1 = µλPt , the marginal buyer's reaction
curve is
(2) λ = (1- δ + δµ)-1 .
A Nash equilibrium under perfect information by both parties occurs when the reaction
curves are mutually consistent, which occurs with
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(3) µ =[ (1-δ )1/2 – (1-δ) ]/δ , and
(4) λ = (1-δ )-1/2 .
The time path of equilibrium prices under this solution is (µ k, λµ2 k , λ2µ3 k , …).
For i=.10, this time path of prices is (0.23k, 0.18k, 0.14k, 0.11 k, 0.08 k, …) and with a
five-year life cycle of the trait, T=5, this becomes (0.88, 0.68, 0.52, 0.40, 0.31). For a
discount rate of .20, the comparable numbers are (0.29k, 0.21k, 0.15k, 0.10 k, 0.07k, …)
and (0.87, 0.62, 0.44, 0.31, 0.22). We show in Figure 3 the first four prices in the
sequence of equilibrium prices and quantities corresponding to the 20% discount rate.
Buyers capture surplus equal to the shaded area, while the seller captures rent equal to
the area beneath. The latter area, total revenue received, equals 0.51 for a 10% discount
rate or 0.52 for a 20% rate. By comparison, the present value of returns from annual
technology fees (kp* = k/2) would be 1.89 and 1.50 for these two discount rates. This
illustrates the "problem" (from the monopolist's point of view) of the pricing of durables:
he earns only about a third of the normal monopoly rent, let alone any additional gains
from intertemporal price discrimination.
Now relax the assumption of perfect and costless property rights. Suppose, first,
that only a randomly-determined fraction θ of potential customers can be excluded from
pirating the trait (i.e., from acquiring it from a supplier other than the patent owner or his
licensee.) Then the derived demand curve (analogous to vpp in Figure 2) is represented
by a clockwise pivoting of the valuation schedule V through the point (V=k, q= 0) in
Figure 3, which would result in no change at all in the time path of equilibrium prices.
The seller's revenues would fall, however, to the fraction θ of the level under perfect
property rights. The seller's optimization problem would now include the amount to be
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spent on enforcement, if the fraction θ is affected by enforcement effort, but that
problem is not directly relevant to questions addressed in this paper.
Suppose, alternatively, that buyers set a limit price φ V, above which they would
choose to pirate the trait rather than purchase it from the seller. This would result in a
counterclockwise rotation of the valuation schedule V through the point (V=0, q=1.0).
The Nash equilibrium price path through time would fall to the fraction φ of the level
under perfect property rights.
Hence within the framework of a plant breeders' rights regime in which
purchasers are permitted to re-plant the crop with the trait, this game theoretic analysis
results in an initial price only one-fourth or so of the one-shot monopoly price, followed
by prices that decline even further. Piracy would reduce the seller's returns
proportionately below even these levels.

Will buyers of a durable crop trait pay for a durable?
To this point we have concluded that under a UPOV/PVPA breeder's rights
regime, it is plausible that the seller of a technologically durable trait will charge a price
that declines through time as suggested by Coase's conjecture. The height of this
declining price path is clearly restricted by buyers' knowledge that the seller will in the
future have an incentive to lower the price. However, in the case of a crop trait, today's
customers are potential competitors of the monopolist – they will have the capability of
selling the trait the next year. The entire crop of the first-year adopters could be used for
seed the following year. Reproductive rates in small grains are on the order of 30 or
more to one, so even a 3% adoption rate in year one would provide sufficient seed for the
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entire crop the following year. The price that the trait owner can charge the first
marketing year therefore depends crucially on whether he can be credibly expected to
exclude the future dissemination of the trait by those first-year buyers. Recall that as
specified above, first-year buyers will only purchase if P1 < (1-δ)kv+δP2e = δ v + δ (P2e –

δTv ). In the extreme case that next year's price, P2 , is expected to be zero, the buyer will
pay no more for the trait than v, the value of its services for the coming year alone2, the
owner would charge a price equal to the optimal rent, P=r*, and sales would cease with
this first year. Only if the owner could exclude all potential customers from this pirating
activity could the time path of price and sales through time be as high as that derived in
the previous section.

Conclusions
Crop traits are technologically durable if they are embodied in the seed of a truebreeding variety as opposed to a hybrid seed. If the trait is protected by a utility patent,
the owner can be expected to charge the monopoly rental rate, or technology fee, each
and every year for use of that trait. This rental rate should be in the vicinity of the
median level of customers' valuations of the service of the trait for one year, with
approximately half of the potential adopters choosing to adopt. However, if the trait is
protected only by breeders' rights, the buyer retains the right to use the trait in the future,
and the owner is selling a durable good to that buyer. Using an explicit game-theoretic
model of trait pricing, we find that the Nash equilibrium path of prices through time is in
accord with Coase's conjecture about the pricing of durable goods. The price charged for
the initial release of five-year durable trait can be expected to be about 75% larger than
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the annual monopoly rental rate, but the present value of revenues would be only about
25% of those from annual monopoly prices. While this result holds for a trait protected
by breeders' rights, a similar result could occur under utility patent protection, if
enforcement costs under the legal system are sufficiently high.

References
Coase, R. H. 1972. Durability and Monopoly. Jl. Law and Econ. 15:143-149.
Deardorff, A.V. 1992. Welfare effects of global patent protection. Economica 59:35-51.
Diwan, I., and D. Rodrik. 1991. Patents, Appropriate Technology and North-South
Trade. J. Int. Econ. 30:27-47.
GAO (U.S. General Accounting Office). 2000. Information on Prices of Genetically
Modified Seeds in the United States and Argentina. GAO/RCED/NSIAD-00-55.
Giannakas, K. 2000. "Intellectual Property Rights under Costly and Imperfect
Enforcement." Unpublished manuscript, University of Nebraska.
Perrin, R. K. 1994. Intellecutal Property Rights in Agricultural Development. In
Anderson, J.R. (ed), Agricultural Technology: Policy Issues for the International
Community. CAB International, Wallingford.
Perrin, Richard K. 1999. Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Country
Agriculture. Agricultural Economics 21:221-229.
Sobel, Joel and Ichiro Takahashi. 1983. A Multistage Model of Bargaining. Rev. of
Econ. Stud. 50:411-426.
Tirole, Jean. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

12

Zilberman, David. undated manuscript. Value and Pricing of Agricultural Biotechnology
Products under Alternative Regimes of Intellectual Property Rights.

v

1.0

v- schedule of users' valuations of flow of
services from the good = 1-q

p*=1/2

MR – marginal revenue

1/2

1.0

q

Figure 1. User evaluations of annual benefit of a trait
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Figure 2. Effective demand with imperfect property rights.

14

k
V- users' valuations of present value of
services from the good = V = k(1- q)
Pd – buyers' limit price
= V/λ = k(1 – q)/λ
k/λ
Ps – sellers' mark-down price
= µV = µk (1- q)

P1= µk
P2
P3
P4
q1

q2

q3

q4

1.0

q

Figure 3. Nash equilibrium pricing of a durable trait.
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See Perrin , Moschini and Lapan, Giannakas .
This would be technically true only for an asset with infinite life, which is effectively the case if a new
asset can be acquired for free any time in the future. Given a T-year asset life as in the inequality here, the
buyer expecting a zero price next year would pay even less than the value of current services, by the
amount of the present value of services he would obtain in year T+1 if he postponed purchase.
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